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1.  Introduction 
The failure of several LDC's to meet the original payment 
schedule on their loans from foreign banks ushered in the  "debt 
crisis' at the beginning of the 1980's.  Since then various theories 
have been proposed to explain the  causes of this crisis.  These 
theories have stressed alternatively the macroeconomic shocks faced by 
LDC's (as  a consequence of a US economic policy after the  second oil 
shock that resulted in high real interest rates, a world wide 
recession, and unfavorable terms of trade)  ,  the  failure of LDC 
governments  to adjust to the new economic environment, and the 
existence of market imperfections (resulting, for example, from 
collective action problem within syndicates and the threat of 
default) 1 
The problems and the factors that influence the renegotiation 
process, however, have  received far less theoretical attention.  A few 
exceptions are Sachs  (1983),  Krugman  (1985),  and Bulow and Rogoff 
(1986). 
Sachs shows that if banks possess an increasing marginal cost of 
loans and if each bank  negotiates separately with the debtor country, 
default  is a possible  competitive equilibrium when the country faces a 
See Kahier (1986) for a review of these theories. 2 
temporary liquidity crisis although the country is not insolvent. 
This occurs because it may not be in the  interest of any individual 
bank to extend a further loan to the debtor to allow it to avoid 
default if the bank expects all other banks to stop lending.  If all 
banks have the  same expectation, the  result is self—confirming. 
Krugmsn shows that collusive action on the part of creditors can, 
by allowing banks to offer lower interest rates and large enough new 
loans, avert the debt crisis that may arise if creditors acted 
competitively.  He points out the free—rider problem that may exist, 
however, if creditors aren't perfectly collusive. 
Bulow and Rogoff use Rubinstein'a (1982)  bargaining model to 
examine how a debtor country and a bank may bargain over repayment of 
a loan.  The perfect equilibrium is characterized by both parties 
achieving an agreement instantaneously and, if the solution lies in 
the "bargaining region," the relative shares of each party are in 
inverse proportion to their respective rate of impatience in reaching 
a settlement. 
None of the above analyses, however, have examined the effect 
that reputational considerations may have on negotiations.  These are 
an extremely important element in reality, as can be seen by the fact 
that favorable terms obtained by one country are almost always 
referred to in subsequent negotiations by other countries.2 
Rescheduling is an extremely complicated process involving 
hundreds of banks and loans of various maturities and terms.  In a 
2  For example, the terms obtained by Mexico in 1986 were thought 
to be concessionary and were demanded in subsequent negotiations by 
Brazil and Argentina. 3 
typical scenario, a troubled debtor approaches a major creditor and 
asks for changes in its repayment schedule.  This bank then consults 
with other important creditors and a creditor committee is set up. 
The syndication and collective bargaining technique employed by banks 
enable thea to reapond to many of the  adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and endogenous default problems endemic to international lending.  The 
sharing of information lowers its  cost and allows for greater 
monitoring of borrowers.  Moreover, the cost of default to borrowers 
is increa ed since collective sanctions are now feasible.3 
There does not exist any simple harmony of interest among 
creditors, however.  Tkey are a heterogeneous group characterized by 
different degrees of exposure to the various countries, by different 
economic  riea to each borrower, and by different roles played within 
the field of international banking.  This paper seeks to examine how 
existing asymoletries  among creditors influence the negotiation proceas 
between creditors and debtors.  An obvious differentiation among banks 
is by size:  there is a small group of very large international banks 
such as Citibank, Chase, Lloyds, etc.  and then a much larger group of 
small banks.  Renegotiation  is essentially carried out by this group 
of larger banks.  It is they who sit on the creditor committee, engage 
in data collection, come up with how much  "new money" must be included 
in the  rescheduling package, and reach an agreement with the debtor 
country.  It is then up to the smaller banks to ratify the agreement. 
Equilibria such as the one derived by Sachs are ruled out since 
the syndicate will not adopt solutions that are collectively 
irrational. 4 
Although the small banks have not had too much problem in 
accepting the new terms proposed by the large banks on outstanding 
loans, they have been much more unhappy about providing the new loana 
required as part of the rescheduling package.  US regulations require 
that loans on which interest payments have not been made to be 
downgraded after ninety days.  Therefore US banks have an additional 
incentive to keep interest payments current and hence to engage in 
"involuntary loans" in order to enable the  debtor country to do ao. 
To ensure that on  bank's involuntary loans are not used to pay off 
the interest on another bank's loan,  participation  in involuntary 
loans takea a pro rata form,  i.e.  each bank participates in all new 
loans in proportion to its  existing exposure. 
Not all banks are equally sanguine, however, about extending new 
loans.  The larger banks have a much greater stake in the 
renegotiation process than do the smaller ones.  Not only are they the 
largest creditors, but also their exposure relative  to capital is much 
higher.4  Moreover, as emphasized by Lipson (1986), large banks 
perceive  themaelves as having permanent interests in the stable 
operation of international capital markets.  They have long—standing 
ties both to other major institutional players and to many of the 
debtor countries.  Their relationship often extends to state agencies, 
local firms, and to the domestic banking system of the debtor country. 
To the extent that there is a long run benefit from maintaining these 
relationships  and a greater vulnerability to any writedown in the 
For example, in 1985 the nine major US banks' exposure to 
problem debtors in Latin America was 148.6% of capital as compared to 
36.9% of all other banks  (excluding the top fifteen banks).  Source: 
Federal Reserve. 5 
value of outstanding loans, a large bank will be more willing to 
participate in involuntary loans than a small bank with less exposure 
and with no such ties to the  international community or to a sovereign 
debtor. 
The greater reluctance of smaller banks to participate in 
involuntary loans often implies that the  larger banks must resort to 
pressuring the latter in order to ensure participation.  An attempt by 
a small bank to hold out can be met by the threat of blacklisting  from 
future internati,  nal lending and, more importantly, by a threat to 
their domestic operations since large banks provide important services 
to small banks in the domestic market.  As a last resort, as recounted 
by Kraft (1984) in the Mexican case,  the Federal Reserve or the 
Treasury may also bring pressure to bear. 
This paper seeks to examine how differences among banks' 
interests influences rescheduling.  We attempt to show that the 
presence  of small banks and the existence of uncertainty on the part 
of the country as to how much pressure a big bank may be able to exert 
over a small one results in harsher terms for the debtor.  The 
presence of asymmetric information gives rise to a reputation effect 
and to a dynamic game in which partial defaults may occur. 
2. The Model 
Reflecting  the reality of the negotiation process, negotiations 
are thought of as occurring between big banks and the debtor country 
over the terms of repayment of all loans, and between big and small 
banks as to the degree of participation of small banks in new involuntary loans.  The large banks are assumed to act collusively. 
The small banks, however, are perfect competitors; they take the  terms 
of agreement reached by the large banks and the  country as given and, 
since small banks are not legally required to participate in 
involuntary lending, simply decide whether they wish to participate or 
not.  It is assumed that participation takes a pro rata form.  Non- 
participation implies, however, that the small banks may then incur 
the costs that can be imposed on them by the  large banks.  These costs 
can result from being blacklisted from future international lending 
and,  more importantly, from domestic loan participation and from the 
use of banking services provided by the big banks.  Big banks are 
assumed to incur zero transaction costs in applying pressure to small 
banks. 
The country is engaged in paying interest on its debt over N 
periods.  In each period rL of the debt payment is renegotiated.  The 
country attempts to obtain new loans in order to finance this 
repayment.  These can be conceived of as being new long—term loans 
which will then be refinanced in the  future (with a low probability  of 
repayment), or alternatively as a partial writedown of the debt.  The 
country can also choose to partially default, however, by refusing  to 
repay that portion of the debt that has come up for repayment.  The 
costs incurred in doing so,  D>O, reflect the costs of being restricted 
to barter  trade and from any form of international lending during that 
period. ] 
The payoffs to banks and country in any one period is as follows: 
—rL +  if agreement 
—D  if no agreement 
I  rL,0 
— f  if agreement 
1 
if no agreement 
rL  — 1.  if participates 
=  rL  —  6  if does not participate 
0  if no agreement 
where 6 is the cost to small banks imposed by the large banks, 
LLb+Ls, LLn0+.5,  denotes involuntary loans/writedowns, and 
subscripts b and s signify big and small banks respectively.  It is 
assumed for notational simplicity that there is only one large and one 
small bank. 
It may be very difficult, however, for a country to know how much 
pressure big banks can apply on small banks.  It is sensible to 
assume, therefore, that the country is uncertain about the maximum 
amount of pressure  that the large bank can exert.  For simplicity we 
assume that the maximum cost that big banks can inflict on small 
banks, 6, may be either high or low, i.e.  &E(6H,6L), 5H>6L 
It is well known that the equilibria of a strategic non- 
cooperative game played between two agents is very sensitive to the 
institutional framework in which the game is embedded.  Furthermore, 
the analysis required is quite complex.  As a result, there have been 
few explicitly strategic analyses of the debt crisis (two exceptions 8 
are Bulow and Rogoff, and Fernandez and Rosenthal  (1988)).  In this 
paper we do not undertake to solve the bargaining problem between  the 
large bank and the country in each stage of the game.  Instead, we 
assume that the  solution to this bargaining problem is given by the 
Nash bargaining solution.  While this is an ad hoc assumption  (with 
the unappealing property that it imposes a cooperative solution), we 
argue that the particular solution concept adopted is not essential 
for our results; what matters is the ranking of the payoffs in a way 
that will be made explicit further on in the paper.  This allows us to 
treat our problem as a finitely repeated game with asymmetric 
information. 
Any solution to the bargaining problem between debtor and 
creditor naturally depends on the true value of 5,  5*,  and on the 
country's belief as to the value of 5.  We assume that the country 
and the bank can give instructions to their respectiwe negotiating 
teams to negotiate as if 5* were either 5H or 5L'  regardless of the 
true value of 5,  and that if both negotiating teams agree on the 
value of 5, the bargaining outcome reached is given by the Nash 
bargaining solution. 
The game played between the big bank and the country is of the 
following  form.  In each period the country first declares whether it 
wishes to take a "tough" stance, that is it declares that it will 
negotiate as if 55H' or a "conciliatory" stance, that is it declares 
that it will negotiate as if =5  (the reasoning behind this 
terminology will become evident below).  The big bank is then also 
given the same choice of negotiation strategies with the reverse 9 
terminology associated with the respective negotiating positions, i.e. 
the claim =8  is conciliatory whereas the claim —8  is tough. 
If both the big bank and the country play tough (i.e.  the bank 
declares =8  and the country 8=8H no agreement is reached and a 
default is declared for that period.  The country suffers a default 
penalty (which is assumed to he greater than the total amount of money 
owed by the country in that period, i.e.  D>rL).  If both parties agree 
to negotiates as if 8=8L (i.e.  the country adopts a conciliatory 
position)  then the payoffs are C and W  respectively for the country 
and big bank.  If both players agree to negotiate as if  the 
country receives T and the big bank receives ZL or ZH depending on 
the true value of the maximum amount of pressure that the big bank  can 
apply on the small bank.  If the big bank can only apply a maximum of 
88L then,  although it negotiated as if 88H'  if L is large enough 
the big bank will be forced to make part of the loans which if 
the small bank would make.  It is assumed that the big bank respecta 
the pro rata rule and does not attempt to extract a greater proportion 
of loans from the small bank than that which is stipulated by this 
requirement.  That is,  the maximum amount that the big bank can 
extract from the small bank is min(8*,aL5) where a is the percentage 
of the big bank's original loan that the big bank pays as an 
involuntary loan.  The complete set of one—period payoffs is presented 
in the game tree in Figure 1. 
By assumption, the values of C, T, and  are given by the 
solution to the Nash bargaining problem in  (2).  That is, L  is chosen 
to solve 10 
Max  [iL) + D][lrb(L)]  (2> 
The small bank's contribution to L depends  on the magnitude of 
relative to .  Note that f.  can  be written as 
A  f  (Lb)  L= 
.  +aI 
(3) 
according to whether or not the large bank has needed to apply the 
maximum amount of pressure that it states it can.5  Hence the 
maximization problem may be divided into two paicts depending on 
whether the a that maximizes  (2) is greater or smaller than S/L5. 
For msS/L5 (2) can be written as 
Max  [—rL  +  a(Lb  + L) +  D] [rL,0 — 
aL,0]  (4) 
The first order condition yields 
a=[(2rL - D) 
- A]/2L  (5) 
A ￿  0,  6/L5 
— a ￿  0,  A(8/L5 
— a)  — 0 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. 
Note that if 2rL<D, a is negative.  This solution to (2)  implies that 
the country pays more than what it owes in order to avoid default.  We 
rule this out by imposing an additional constraint on  (2):  1. ￿  0. 
For a  S/L5 (2)  can be written as 
Max  {—rL  + 
aL,0+  S +  D][rLb_  aL,0]  (6) 
This formulation assumes that when the small bank drops out of 
making further loans, it still contributes £ since that is the 
maximum that the big bank  can extract. 11 
The first order condition yields 
a - ([r(  + L)  -  ( + D)]  + A)/2(Lb)2  (7) 
A ￿  0,  a — S/L5 ￿  0,  A(8/L5 —  a)  — 0 
Whether the solution is given by (5) or  (7)  depends on the 
parameters of the model.  We can distinguish among five cases: 
Case 1:  The Nash solution is the constrained solution for both 
and 
SSL: Q8/L  b[r(sL/L5)l c_&Ls)_r 
56H  0=SH/Ls  b_[r(sH/L5)]I_b C={(sH/L5)_r1L 
Case 2:  The Nash solution is the constrained solution for  and 
an interior solution with a<SH/L5  for 
SSL  o8J'L  b[r(sL/L5)IhD  c(&LAs)_r] 
a is given by  (5) with A—0 
lrb  (r_a)Lb 
Case 3:  The Nash solution is characterized by a>SL/L5 for  and 
a<&H/Ls for 65H  Note that in this case the big bank's payoff 
under 85L  may be larger or smaller than with  whereas the 
country's payoff is necessarily smaller. 
Case 4:  The Nash solution for  is a>SL/LS and for 5=5H is 
a>SH/L5.  Here both the big bank and the  country's payoffs are greater 
if 5=6H (this can be seen graphically by noting that the slope of the 
level sets of (ire  +  D)(lrb)  depend only on the ratio of 7r+D to tb) 12 
Case 5:  The Nash solution for  is m<SL/Ls.  Here the payoffs are 
the same for both values of 5. 
Figure 2 gives a graphical representation of the Nash solution 
for case 2.  Note that in all cases the country's payoff is larger if 
In order for a reputacional effect to come into play, two 
conditions must be met:  1) W>ZH and 2)  ZL<O.  The first condition 
specifies that the big bank's payoff should be larger when both bank 
and country agree to negotiate as if 8=6  (i.e.  the country adopts a 
conciliatory position) than if both parties agree to negotiate as if 
55H (i.e.  the  country adopts a tough position and the big bank is 
conciliatory).  That is,  the big bank's payoff should be greater if it 
can "convince" the country that it is not able to extract a large new 
loan  (or  forgiveness) from the small bank than if the country 
believes  that it lies within the big bank's power to apply a large 
amount of pressuce on the small bank.  This condition is always met in 
cases 1 and 2 above and may be met in case 3.  In case 4, ir when 
is greater than lrb  when 88L' whereas in case 5 the payoffs are 
equal regardless of  the value of  We shall restrict our attention 
to those cases for which the  first condition is satisfied.  The second 
condition stipulates that when the big bank  negotiates as though 
if in reality 5*=&L the big bank's payoff should be lower than 
the cost of no agreement.  For the second condition to be met the 
difference  must be "large".  We shall assume this to be the 
case. 
In a static and complete information version of this game,  the 13 
subgame—perfect Nash equilibrium would be 6L'8L) jf 56  and 
if  where the first term in the parenthesis refers to the 
negotiation stance taken by the country and the second to that taken 
by the bank.  The reason for this is that when 6*_SL and the latter is 
common knowledge, the big bank cannot credibly threaten to play tough 
since, if called upon to do so,  it would be made worse off than by 
acquiescing and being conciliatory.  Subgame perfection rules out 
equilibria based on incredible threats. The fact that this game is 
played over N peciods  (in each period rL of the debt is negotiated) 
and that the country does not know 6* implies that there may be an 
incentive for the bank to take a tough position, i.e.  to play as if 
68L  even if 86H'  in the hope of convincing the country that it has 
little bargaining power over the small bank.  As has been shown by 
Kreps and Wilson (l982b) ,  for  a large enough N the  reputational effect 
comes into play. 
The general structure of the game is as follows.  There are N 
periods in which the  game shown in Figure 1 is played.6  Time is 
indexed backwards so that first stage N is played, then N—i  then 
1.  The possible payoffs of the big bank depend on 6*,  whereas those 
of the country are independent of 6*.  The bank knows the true value 
of .  The  country,  on  the  other  hand,  starts  out  with  an  initial 
belief  as  to  the  probability  that 
c5*..SL. 
As in Kreps and Wilson, we look for a sequential equilibrium. 
This has the following properties:7 a) Every extensive game has at 
6  Another interpretation of the game is that in each period a 
different country's debt comes up for renegotiation (with N countries 
in total) with the same big bank. 
See Kreps and Wilson  (l982a)  for a fuller discussion of 
sequential equilibria. 14 
least one sequential equilibrium. b) If a set of beliefs and 
strategies for the players constitutes a sequential equilibrium, then 
the set of strategies constitutes a subgaae—perfect Nash equilibrium. 
Three conditions must be fulfilled for a sequential equilibrium: 
1) Each player called upon to make a move has a probability estimate 
of what previously occurred.  2) The estimate satisfies Bayes' rule, 
whenever the later applies.  3) At every node, including nodes off the 
equilibrium path,  the players follow optimal strategies given their 
probability assessment of that node and contingent on the prior 
history of moves. 
The game begins with Pg  the initial probability assigned by the 
country to the possibility that 5*._SL,  exogenously specified.  A 
sequential equilibrium to the  game is given below.  It is described by 
a function n' a strategy for the  country, and a strategy for the big 
bank.  We shall then proceed to show that these constitute a 
sequential equilibrium. 
The country's probability assessment. Pn: 
a).  If the country adopts a conciliatory position in stage n+l, then 
b).  If both the country and the bank play tough in stage n+1, then 
where b.-(T—C)/(T+D). 
c).  If the country plays tough in stage n+l and either the bank adopts 
a conciliatory position or n+l°' then 
This describes how n  is computed at every node of the game. 15 
Strategies: 
The country:  At each atage n,  the country compares n' the 
probability that the country assigns to the event S*=&L  with b".  If 
the country is conciliatory.  If  Pn=b'', the country is 
conciliatory with probability a, where oZH/(W_ZH).  If Pn<b''  the 
country is tough. 
The big bank:  If it has little power over the small bank (5*=SL), 
always takes a tough position.  If it has a lot of power over the 
small bank (6*=SH), then:  If the players are in the  last stage of 
negotiation, that is,  if n=l, the bank is conciliatory.  If n>l and 
the bank plays tough.  If n>l and Pn<b''1  the bank 
randomizes and takes a tough position with probability Xnt where 
[Pn_bn  ]/[  (l_pn)bn_lI. 
The beliefs and strategies described above constitute a 
sequential equilihriun.  This can be demonstrated by showing that the 
beliefs of the country are  consistent with the strategy of the bank 
(in the sense that Bayes' rule holds wherever  it applies) and that, 
givem one agent's strategy, the other agent is following a payoff 
maximizing strategy. 
The consistency of beliefs can be verified by noting that when 
the country is conciliatory no information is gained, so nl=n If 
Pnml,  the big bank is tough with probability one.  If p,.,-'O,  the 
bank (with &*._SH)  is conciliatory.  Hence, as long as the big bank 
follows its strategy, by Bayes' rule n—rn  in both  cases.  If 
bn—l), the bank is tough with probability Xn.  The big bank 
takes a conciliatory stance only if &*_6H.  Hence, if the bank is ever 
conciliatory, n—l=°  Lastly, if in period n the bank took a tough 16 
position then Bayes' rule requires: 
n—l  Pr(S=SLj6L)Pr(&L)/[Pr(8=8L&L)Pr(SL)1Pr(5.SLI&H)Pr(&H)] 
= 
Pn/[Pn+Xn(l=Pn)] 
— bn  (8) 
where Pr(**l*) is the probability that the bank took position ** given 
that reality is * and where Pr(*) is the country's prior assessment of 
the probability that the big bank's power over the small bank is . 
This confirms that beliefs and strategies are Bayesian consistent. 
Bayes' rule does not apply for  two different scenarios: 
(i).  pnabm and the bank adopts a conciliatory stance,  and 
(ii).  p=0  and the bank adopts a tough position.  In both cases we set 
That is,  it is assumed that any conciliatory behavior on  the 
part of the bank demonstrates, once and for all, that the true vsloe 
of & is  While in Kreps and Wilson (1982b) this assignment of 
beliefs off the equilibrium path is somewhat arbitrary, in the context 
of our problem if we assume, very plausibly, that the involuntary 
loans made by the big bank and the small bank can be observed 
separately by the country, then conciliatory behavior on the part of 
the big bank does indeed reveal 
Xn is derived by calculating a probability of the bank with 
taking a tough position in period n such that the country is 
indifferent between playing tough and being conciliatory in that 
period.  Hence  solves 17 
C=(1—p)[X(—D)+(l—X)T]  + p(—D)  (9) 
Note that (9)  takes into account the country's assessment of the 
possibility that S truly equals 5L  By Bayes' rule,  however, X 








Note that  is necessarily equal to zero, since in the last round 
there no longer exist any dynamic considerations  (i.e.  there is no 
reputation to be gained by being tough) and the payoff for being tough 
jf 5*=SH is smaller than the payoff for being conciliatory.  Hence, 
the bank  (with 5*=SH) is always conciliatory.  Solving  (10)  and using 
Bayes' rule to express X  as a function of n  and n...l  yields, for 
PnO,b) 
n—l  b 
and  (11) 
X  = 
The  first line of  (11)  gives the country's probability estimate 
in period n—l of the bank's true value of g equalling  6L given that 
in period n  both the bank and the country were tough.  Note that if 
p-o, then X=0, and if p=b1, then 18 
The country's mixed strategy, used whenever n'  is derived by 
calculating the probability, 5n' of the country being  conciliatory in 
stage n  such that the bank (with 5*=5)  is indifferent between being 





1  (12) 





In  the  second  to  last  stage,  the  big  bank's  payoff  for  the 
remaining  stages  is,  if p2<b2: 
rb(58H)  2ZH  (13) 
0 + (p1—b) 
is the expected payoff of the big bank  (with 6*=SH) over the 
remaining stages of the game given that it adopts the strategy of 
negotiating as if &=Si i—H,L in the first period in which the country 
is tough.  Pnbt  is the expected payoff for the n remaining stages 
given 
Setting the two payoffs from the pure strategies in (13)  equal, 
we find 
a1  ZH/(W.ZH)  (14) 
If p2—b2, the pure strategy payoffs are: 
lrb(&8H)'.' a2[W +  ZH]  +  (l—a2)2Z  (15) 
b65L'  a2W  +  ZH]  + (l—a2)[0  +ir(p1=b)] 
In the third to last stage of the game,  if p3<b3 
b8'6H" 3ZH  (16) 
0 + ir(p2—b2) 
Setting the two payoffs in (16)  equal, using (15),  yields: 19 
a2 
= 
ZH/(W_ZH)  (17) 
By induction, the  general form of the payoff for the  rernainingn 
stages of the game is 
0 +  (18) 
if p<b, and 
On[W + (p_1<b)]  + (l—a)[O + (p_1_bfl)J — 
a[W + (n—l)ZH]  + (l—afl)nZH 
— 
(n-+-l)ZH  (19) 
if P=bn,  and8 
a1 
.  a — a — ZH/(W—ZH)  (20) 
We can  now  verify  that  the  players'  strategies  are  optimal.  It 
is  easy  to  show  that  if  the country's estimate V (where V=p+(l_p)X 
of the probability that the big bank will be tough is less 
than b, then the country's expected payoff in that period is strictly 
greater if the  country adopts a tough position rather than a 
conciliatory one.  If P￿bnl,  the bank is tough with probability one. 
Hence it is optimal for the country to be conciliatory since the 
country does not gain information by being tough and would also suffer 
a loss in expected payoff for that period.  If b<p<b1, the bank is 
conciliatory with a positive probability but with a probability less 
than 1—b.  Hence, once again it does not pay for the country to play 
tough. 
We must also show,  however, that the  country cannot gain a long— 
run benefit by being tough when bfl<P<br.  That is, we must show 
that there is no long—run informational gain for the country by being 
tough in this case. 
8 
Note, however,  that if pN_btl for some n￿N,  any randomization  is 
valid for that stage. 20 
ffc,n_1(6H)[pn1_pn)S1 
( [b'1+(i_b')Xn_i] (—D)  + 
(i-b)(i-X1)T) + [(l_pn)(1_Xn)]T 
=(p/b')  {b(_D)+(1_b)T]+[l_(Pn/b)  ]T  (21) 
= T — (D+T)(p/b2) 
is the expected payoff from being tough in turn n—i given that the 
country was  tough in period n.  The expected payoff from being tough 
in turn n—i given that the country was conciliatory in period n is 
c,n_l(SSL)[Pn_lPn_l]([(Pn_l)n_l)]T  (22) 
— T — (D+T)(pnn_2) 
verifying that the expected payoff in turn n—i is invariant to the 
position taken by the auntry in period n.  (Note that in both cases 
the expected payoff from being conciliatory in period n—i is C.) 
This, combined with the fact that the country suffers a loss in its 
expected payoff in period n if it is tough that period, implies that 
the country is following an optimal strategy by being conciliatory 
when  bn<pn<bn_l. 
If pn=bn, the big bank is conciliatory with probability  1—b,  so 
the country is indifferent and randomizes.  An analysis similar to 
that conducted above confirms that there is no long—run benefit  to be 
gained by the country from being tough with probability one. 
The above analysis can also be extended to show that the expected 
payoff in any period n—m, m<n, is also invariant to the negotiating 
position chosen in period n.  This follows from the fact that the 
expected payoff in stage n—i is independent of  n—l  Hence there is 
no dynamic advantage to be gained by altering the strategy.  This 
verifies  the optimality of the country's strategy. 21 
The optimality of the big bank's strategy if 5*=SL is easily 
shown.  If in any period the big bank is ever conciliatory, this 
results in more future tough positions taken by the country than does 
being tough.  Since in the short run fighting is better for the bank 
and in the long run fewer defaults are better, always fighting is the 
optimal strategy for the big bank. 
The expected payoffs  to the big bank with  from following 
its  strategy from stage n to 1  is given by the following function of 
if 
if Pn1  (23) 
b=[n—k(pn)+lJW  + (k(Pn)_UZH  if bn<pn<bk(Pn)_l 
b=[n—k(pn)+lJW  + k(pfl)ZH  if bn<pn_bk(Pn)_l 
where k(p).=inf(n:bn<pn)  for Pn>O and  is understood to be calculated 
for the entire n periods of the game. 
The first two payoffs are obtained from equations  (19)  and (20). 
The third is found by noting that as long as bn<pn the country is 
conciliatory and the big bank receives W in each of those periods. 
The  last period in which this occurs is nk(pn).  Hence the bank 
receives W  for N_k(Pn)+l periods.  If in stage k(pn)_l we have 
then in each period thereafter, k(pn)l  to 1,  the bank 
receives an expected payoff of ZH.  The last equation is the same as 
the third except that in period k(pn)l  pn_ 
(pn)1. instead of the 
prior inequality.  Therefore the bank receives an expected payoff of 
2Z1 instead of ZR in that period. 
Suppose that the country is tough in stage n.  By being 22 
conciliatory, the bank  receives ZH in that period and in every period 
thereafter.  By being tough, the bank receives zero in that period and 
future expected payoffs of (n—l)ZH if n°'  nZH if O<pn￿bn_i., and more 
than nZH if  Thus, the big bank  (with &**5H) is optimizing by 
following the strategy described. 
3.  Implications 
Our model allows us to make a number of predictions about the 
negotiation process.  Most significantly, negotiations will not be 
smooth and agreements will not be reached instantaneously; there will 
be extended periods during which negotiations regularly break down. 
This result is independent of the true value of the big bank's power 
over the small bank.  If the bank has £*_8H, then during the period in 
sthich  the big bank defends its reputation, that is from the first 
period in which pN￿b" until the period in which the bank first adopts 
a conciliatory stance, a default will occur at least every other 
period.  This is clearly seen from the country's strategy set and its 
probability estimating function.  Whenever the bank adopts a tough 
position, this causes the country's reassessment of the probability 
*  .  that  &  to be such that in the next period the country randomizes. 
If the result of this randomization is conciliatory behavior  on the 
part of the country, in the following period the country is tough with 
probability one.  If instead the randomization had resulted in the 
country being tough then, if the bank were also tough, randomization 
would again occur next period.  On the other hand, if the bank has 
it never adopts a conciliatory position.  Hence default occurs 
at least every other period commencing with the first period in which 23 
The introduction of a reputational effect into the negotiation 
process leaves the big bank which has a  great deal of power over the 
small bank (6*=SH) at least as well off as absent this effect.  If 
pN<b,  the big bank is just as well off in terms of its expected 
payoff as without the reputation effect since the complete certainty 
equilibrium has 1rbZH.  If p￿bN,  the bank's payoff is greater with 
the reputational effect.  This follows from (23) where the payoffs 
given by the last three equations are all greater than NZH  (since 
W>ZH).  Thus the big bank's expected payoff is unambiguously  larger 
with the  reputational effect.  The small bank's payoffs move in tandem 
with the big bank's.  Therefore, the same conditions for the 
implications of the reputational effect apply to it.  If the big bank 
has  little power over the small bank (i.e.  &*_SL),  the big bank is 
made worse off by the introduction of asymmetric information since for 
each period in which a default occurs it loses W. 
The country is clearly worse off as a consequence of the 
reputational effect.  If default never occurs, the game is a zero—sum 
game;  with default it is a negative—sum game.  We have already 
established that given &*_SH the big bank is never worse off as a 
consequence of the introduction of a reputational effect.  Moreover, 
the expected number of periods in which default occurs is greater than 
zero (unless initial beliefs are such that the country never 
challenges the bank).  Hence the country's expected payoff is 
necessarily less than in the non—reputation game.  If 5*_&L, the big 
bank never is conciliatory.  Thus,  the country is worse off since each 24 
period in which it challenges the big bank, default occurs, 
occasioning a loss of C+D. 
The existence of small banks is detrimental for the country.  If 
there were no small banks involved in the negotiation process  i.e.  ,  if 
all banks, big and small, were to act collusively as a single big 
bank, the country's payoff in a single period would be greater than or 
equal to its payoff given the existence of small banks.  The new 
solution would be given by m'—(2rL—D)/2L).  Consequently, the total 
amount of involuntary loans/forgiveness would be greater and the 
country's psyoff correspondingly larger.  The big bank, however, would 
not necessarily be worse off since the small bank's participation 
would now be pro rata. 
4.  Conclusion 
The experience of the last few years has demonstrated that debt 
rescheduling negotiations between debtor nations and their creditora 
are far from smooth.  Despite the cost to both parties, the flow of 
new loans and interest payments have been regularly disrupted.  The 
reluctance of the small regional banks to agree to rescheduling terms 
and the concern of the large international banks of the effect that 
the terms of negotiation may have on future negotiations with same or 
with other countries has been an important source of the problem. 
This paper highlights the role played by the presence of small 
banks and asymmetric information in contributing to the existence of a 
reputational effect and hence permitting rocky negotiations.  The 
principle  implication of our analysis is that the country is always 
made worse off as a consequence of the reputational effect.  It also 25 
provides a possible explanation for the recent introduction of exit 
bonds by Argentina.  These long—term, lower interest bonds, targeted 
at the regional banks, would allow the purchaser to be exempt from 
participation  in further rescheduling and lending.  The bonds 
themselves would not be rescheduled, nor would they be included in the 
base that determines the obligation Co provide new money.  As shown by 
our  analysis, the elimination of the reputational effect that this 
would allow makes the country better off.  Also, provided that these 
bonds are not themselves evaluated by  the  small banks as being too 
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